The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Supreme Court

Supreme Court Rejects Missouri's Attempt to Sue New York Over Trump Prosecution

Insofar as the justices split, it was due to long-standing disagreement over the nature of the Court's original jurisdiction.

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This morning, as expected, the Supreme Court rejected the state of Missouri's attempt to sue the state of New York over the prosecution of Donald Trump and the imposition of a gag order during the pendency of appeals. Missouri had filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint against New York in the Court's original jurisdiction. To call the underyling legal theory aggressive would be an understatement (something about how the state law prosecution of a presidential candidate unconstitutionally inhibits the ability of Missouri voters and electors to support the candidate of their choice). Missouri invoked the Court's original jurisdiction by styling this as a dispute between one state and another, and thus sought to bring this suit, in the first instance, in the Supreme Court.

The justices are not having it. The order reads in full:

Missouri's motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied, and its motion for preliminary relief or a stay is dismissed as moot. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito would grant the motion for leave to file the bill of complaint but would not grant other relief.

This means the Court split 7-2 over whether Missouri should be allowed to file its bill of complaint, but was unanimous in rejecting Missouri's request for relief in this case. (In other words, Justices Alito and Thomas would let Missouri make their case, but would not grant any of Missouri's requested relief, which included enjoining the gag order imposed on Trump by New York courts.)

No doubt some commentators will read this order as an indication that Justices Alito and Thomas believe that Missouri's filing had merit. Those that do so will show they know very little about the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and the long-standing debate over whether the Court has jurisdiction to reject bills of complaint filed by states against other states.

The reason that Justices Thomas and Alito dissented form the denial of Missouri's motion for leave to file the bill of complaint is because they believe that when a state seeks to invoke the Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction, the Court is obligated to hear the case. This is also not a new view. See, for instance, this dissent by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, in Arizona v. California. It reads in relevant part:

The Constitution establishes our original jurisdiction in mandatory terms. Article III states that, "[i]n all Cases . . . in which a State shall be [a] Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). In this circumstance, "[w]e have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court).

Our original jurisdiction in suits between two States is also "exclusive." §1251(a). As I have previously explained, "[i]f this Court does not exercise jurisdiction over a controversy between two States, then the complaining State has no judicial forum in which to seek relief." Nebraska v. Colorado, 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (opinion  dissenting from denial of motion for leave to file complaint) (slip op., at 2). Denying leave to file in a case between two or more States is thus not only textually suspect, but also inequitable.

The Court has provided scant justification for reading "shall" to mean "may." It has invoked its "increasing duties with the appellate docket," Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U. S. 794, 797 (1976) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted), and its "structur[e] . . . as an appellate tribunal," Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 498 (1971). But the Court has failed to provide any analysis of the Constitution's text to justify our discretionary approach.

Justice Thomas raised this concern when Nebraska and Oklahoma sought to file a bill of complaint against Colorado over marijuana legalization too.

As I have noted before, Justice Thomas is making a serious argument, and one which I suspect may be correct. Note that this would not mean that the Court has to actually hear oral argument. Rather it would mean that the Court has to accept the bill of complaint and resolve it on the merits—something that would be quite easy to do in a case like this, but might be more difficult in other contexts (e.g. the dormant commerce clause). I suspect the justices do not want to open this door lest they invite other filings in the sorts of cases they prefer to see percolate up through the lower courts, but it is not clear to me the Constitution gives the Court that choice.

Politics

United States v. Abbott and State War Powers

A guest post from Professor Rob Natelson.

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Last week, the en banc Fifth Circuit resolved the buoy case. I am happy to pass on this guest post from Professor Robert Natelson, who co-authored an article on the war powers of the states.

On July 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court should not have granted the United States a preliminary injunction ordering Texas to remove a barrier lying in the Rio Grande River. The case was United States v. Abbott, and it was decided on the issue of navigability. However, the case also has implications for states' power to wage defensive war—and particularly defensive war against illegal immigration.

Andrew T. Hyman and I recently published an examination of those issues in the British Journal of American Legal Studies. We focused mostly on Founding-era evidence of the kind probative of the Constitution's original meaning. Our article played a role in the case—but, as described below, a rather unusual one.

The Parties' Contentions

The State of Texas had placed a 1000-foot floating barrier in the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass, Texas, a busy border-crossing area. The state justified the barrier by invoking state war powers to stem an "invasion."

The U.S. government claimed that Texas's power to respond to the alleged "invasion" had expired. The government also maintained that the state right of self-defense had been qualified by the congressional Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, which forbids obstructing navigable waterways without federal consent. (The Constitution grants Congress jurisdiction over navigable waterways as a component of the Commerce Power.)

Texas countered that under traditional navigability tests, the Rio Grande was not, and never had been, navigable above the city of Roma, Texas—far downstream from the Eagle Pass floating barrier.

State War Powers

The Constitution granted federal officers and entities, as well as the government itself, certain enumerated powers. As confirmed by the Tenth Amendment, it reserved the remainder to the states and the people. Moreover, where the Constitution did not specify that federal authority was exclusive, the states retained concurrent, although subordinate, jurisdiction.

Among the concurrent powers reserved to the states was the prerogative of making war. However, Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 limited that prerogative considerably:

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace . . . or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

In international law terms, Congress could authorize state participation in offensive war. But states retained unconditional power to wage defensive war.

As our study pointed out, this clause retained a balance between federal and state war-making that was approximately the same as that prevailing under the Articles of Confederation.

But only approximately. The Constitution added one further constriction and four expansions of state war powers. Specifically, the Constitution (1) denied state power to issue letters of marque and reprisal—an additional restriction on offensive war but (2) discarded the former limitations on states' ability to wage defensive conflicts.

The Constitution also granted the federal government supreme power to regulate immigration (Article I, Section 8, Clause 10). However, states also retained subordinate concurrent power over that subject. This was recognized in the portion of Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 that referred to free migration as opposed to the importation of slaves: "The Migration . . . of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit . . . .".

Mr. Hyman and I investigated the Founding-era meaning of "invasion" and "invaded" to determine if, as three U.S. appeals courts have opined, those terms were limited to formal attacks by foreign military forces. We found they certainly were not. Both 18th century dictionaries and contemporaneous usage supported definitions broad enough to encompass peaceful but unauthorized cross-border incursions that resulted in damage. For example, in the years before the Constitution was written, both Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania officials referred to a peaceful but unauthorized wave of immigration into their state as an "invasion."

We also learned that during the Founding era, migrants entering a country illegally were considered, or treated as, "alien enemies." They were not accorded the same rights as "alien friends." It made no difference whether an illegal migrants' country of origin was friendly or hostile.

Finally, we examined Founding-era international law to determine the sorts of tools a sovereign may use to fight a defensive war. Not surprisingly, these included barriers to thwart invaders.

So based on our findings, it appeared that Texas was on sound constitutional ground when invoking its defensive war powers to justify building a barrier—at least until one considers the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act.

The Court's Decision

Under that law, if the Rio Grande is "navigable" at the point where Texas constructed its barrier, then a conflict arises between congressional exercise of the Commerce Power and state exercise of defensive war powers.

In United States v. Abbott, the court avoided that conflict. In an opinion written by Judge Don R. Willett, the court concluded that the Rio Grande was not navigable in the area of the barrier, because the river above the city of Roma had never been a "highway of commerce." Although there was some evidence that a ferry had crossed the river near Eagle Pass, Judge Willett held that ferries crossing rivers merely cover gaps in land routes. A ferry may indicate that a lake is navigable, but "Lakes are obviously not rivers."

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Free Speech

Lawsuit Over Alleged Discriminatory Refusal to Let Church Lease School Property on Weekends Can Go Forward

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From Pines Church v. Hermon School Dep't, decided last week by Chief Judge Lance Walker (D. Me.):

Plaintiffs The Pines Church and its lead pastor, Matt Gioia, looking for a new space to accommodate their growing congregation, requested a twelve-month lease to hold Sunday services at Hermon High School. The Defendant Hermon School Department's School Committee, after meeting and discussing the challenges associated with such a relationship, did not make a motion to vote on the requested twelve-month lease. Furthermore, the Committee members refused to second a motion to vote on a six-month lease. Ultimately, the Committee voted to offer Plaintiffs a month-to-month lease.

Plaintiffs filed this civil action, alleging that the School Committee's refusal to extend a long-term lease was motivated by animus against their sincerely held religious views …. The School Department offers a competing characterization of events, maintaining that the School Committee's decision was influenced by concerns about entering into a long-term lease agreement.

Before the Court are the parties' competing motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs rely on the relatively blatant bias and the inferences that arise from the interrogatories posed by one Committee member who demanded to know from Pastor Gioia the Church's "position" on a spate of religious, political, and cultural flashpoints before evaluating whether to extend a lease on behalf of a publicly funded school.

Plaintiffs also rely on a somewhat more tepid bias, sanitized through fear-of-association comments by others, along the lines that association with the Church may not fit with the Committee's "goals" and may therefore create a "negative image" by not comporting with the School Department's "mission" and evidently its own beliefs. This evidence certainly is probative of Plaintiffs' position that the School Committee's refusal to offer Plaintiffs a lease was motivated by unconstitutional considerations, such as animus toward the Church's orthodox religious beliefs.

For its part, the School Department counters that the School Committee's decision, save for the one Committee member's bill of particulars put to the Pastor, simply resulted from humdrum, benign space and cost concerns, although that narrative is far from conclusive based on the summary judgment record. These competing characterizations of the Committee's motivations form the most conspicuous reason I deny summary judgment to the parties in favor of a jury trial.

More on the facts of the case:

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Free Speech

D.C. Circuit Strikes Down Automated Filtering of Supposedly "Off-Topic" Comments on NIH Site

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In last week's People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Tabak, the D.C. Circuit (in an opinion by Judge Bradley Garcia, joined by Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson and Patricia Millett), held that NIH's automated filtering of comments on Facebook and Instagram pages was unconstitutional. The filtering was supposedly aimed at blocking "off-topic" posts, but it did so by filtering out words "such as … 'animal,' 'testing,' and 'cruel.'" This was unconstitutional, the court held because a government-agency-run comment section was a "limited public forum," where restrictions on public speech had to be "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum" and "viewpoint neutral," requirements that weren't satisfied here:

Reasonableness is to be assessed in light of the purpose of the forum, which here is to "communicate and interact with citizens," and to "encourage respectful and constructive dialogue" through the public's comments. Reasonableness in this context is thus necessarily a more demanding test than in forums that have a primary purpose that is less compatible with expressive activity, like [speech by attendees at a] football stadium …. In service of those purposes, NIH's off-topic restriction furthers the "permissible objective[s]," of creating comment threads dedicated to each post's topic and allowing the public to engage on that topic, instead of being distracted or overwhelmed by off-topic comments.

But NIH must "draw a reasonable line,"  informed by "objective, workable standards," between what is considered on-topic and what is considered off-topic. "Although there is no requirement of narrow tailoring," the government "must be able to articulate some sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out." This NIH has not done.

In the context of NIH's posts—which often feature research conducted using animal experiments or researchers who have conducted such experiments—to consider words related to animal testing categorically "off-topic" does not "ring[ ] of common-sense." For example, consider NIH's July 20, 2021 Instagram post, which featured a photo of the eye of a zebrafish. The caption read, in part: "This picture of an anesthetized adult zebrafish was taken with a powerful microscope that uses lasers to illuminate the fish." It is unreasonable to think that comments related to animal testing are off-topic for such a post. Yet a comment like "animal testing on zebrafish is cruel" would have been filtered out because "animal," "testing," and "cruel" are all blocked by NIH's keyword filters.

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Supreme Court

Biden-Harris on Supreme Court Term Limits

An attack on the independence of the federal judiciary.

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President Biden launched an attack on the independence of the federal judiciary on July 29th when he endorsed the packing of the U.S. Supreme Court. He did this in an op-ed in the Washington Post and then in a partisan speech that same day commemorating the 60th anniversary of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His Vice President, Kamala Harris, endorsed Biden's comments and indicated that she would be more aggressive on this issue than Biden has been. Packing the Supreme Court is thus a key issue in the 2024 presidential and senatorial elections, as GOP Senate candidates running in red or purple states like Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Nevada, and Arizona should make clear.

Technically, Biden and Harris are probably calling for a statute that would unconstitutionally limit the voting rights of Supreme Court justices to 18-year terms in violation of Article III of the Constitution. I base this inference on my knowledge of the proceedings of President Biden's Supreme Court Reform Commission, since Biden's July 29th op-ed and speech provided no specifics. The Biden-Harris proposal of July 29th reflects the fact that a solid majority of voters oppose court packing, but voters like the idea of Supreme Court term limits by a large margin. Term limits on Supreme Court justices could be legally imposed by constitutional amendment, which would require a bipartisan consensus, and, if the term limit were long enough, it might be somewhat reconcilable with judicial independence. In reality, the Biden-Harris proposal is both a disguised court packing plan, which voters rightly oppose, and it is also unconstitutional and the greatest threat to judicial independence since President Franklin D. Roosevelt tried unsuccessfully, in 1937, to increase the size of the Supreme Court from 9 to 15 justices.

Biden tipped his hand that he is asking for a statute imposing an 18-year term limit on the voting rights of Supreme Court justices in cases or controversies before the Supreme Court because, in his July 29th proposal, he called for a constitutional amendment to overturn a recent Supreme Court case that he disagreed with, but he pointedly did not call for a constitutional amendment to enact an 18-year term limit on Supreme Court justices' voting rights on cases before the Supreme Court. Biden also did not specify whether such a package would apply retroactively to the nine current Supreme Court justices or prospectively, as some members of his Presidential Commission on Supreme Court reform have suggested it should. President Biden, and some members of his Commission, seem to think that the mere passage of a statute and not a constitutional amendment is all that is needed to eliminate the voting rights of Supreme Court justices once they have served for 18 years. I am not aware of any Republican member of Biden's Commission or of any right of center legal scholar or lawyer who currently thinks that what Biden-Harris are contemplating is constitutional.

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Justice Gorsuch Explains What Collegiality Means

Does it mean going to the opera together, or a willingness to be persuaded?

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It seems that Justice Gorsuch is going through the media circuit in advance of his book launch. Yesterday I wrote about this interview with the Wall Street Journal. Today, David French of the New York Times published a transcript of his NMG sit down. To go back to one of my hobby horses, when a publisher gives a book deal to a Justice, with a large advance, the publisher knowns that the media will gladly sit down for interviews in Supreme Court chambers. This is free press that cannot be purchased–well it can be purchased with a substantial advance. All the more reason to place a cap on royalties for Justices. I digress.

French and Gorsuch had an extended discussion of what was learned from the COVID cases. In truth, we need to reflect a lot more on that period than we have. So many of us (present company included) made some terrible decisions. Our faith in the power of government and self-professed "experts" was largely misplaced. And nothing that has happened since the pandemic has restored my faith. Chief Justice Roberts's "super-precedent" in South Bay has not aged well. I have to imagine that distrust was lurking in the background of Loper Bright.

I found the most enlightening exchange to turn on collegiality. I think that is a term that many people use to mean different things. It was well known that Justices Scalia and Ginsburg were dear friends, and often socialized together. They were collegial. But did RBG ever persuade Scalia to change his mind, at least on a big case? Probably not. Does that mean they were not collegial?

Of late, Justice Kagan has been pushing the latter conception of collegiality–that it entails having an open mind, and a willingness to be persuaded. I have to imagine this push is part of her effort to corral Justice Barrett's votes at every opportunity. If there is any common thread with Joan Biskupic's reporting, is that Justice Kagan flipped Justice Barrett in several cases. I've yet to see any indication that a conservative Justice has flipped a liberal member of the court to reach a conservative outcome. Flipping is not ambidextrous–it only works on the left.

I for one, reject the notion that collegiality entails a willingness to reconsider your views. It is always a judge's role to find the truth, and determine the best answer to a particular legal dispute by his or her best lights. And that process primarily entails weighing the arguments advanced by counsel, and deciding which side should prevail. To be sure, judges on a multi-member court will lobby one another for this position or that position. And to maintain relations, it is important to be willing to listen. But I do not think collegiality requires anything more than listening. Indeed, there are problems with this sort of ex-post lobbying that happens after the briefs are submitted and arguments conclude. Perhaps the parties have obvious rejoinders to some post-hoc position raised, but there is no chance to discuss it. The vote at conference reflects an assessment of the actual case, as it is presented. But when votes change after conference, invariably, it will be because of some newly-determined facet of the case that the parties did not have the chance to address. The Court could always order re-briefing and re-argument, but alas, the pattern has been to simply decide cases on grounds that would be entirely foreign to the lower courts. NetChoice and Moyle comes to mind.

David French poses this question to Justice Gorsuch, which he sort-of-answers, indirectly.

French: Justice Kagan gave some remarks to the Ninth Circuit recently where she talked about this issue of collegiality within the court. There's been some friendships, for example, most famously of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Antonin Scalia. Also recently, Justice Sonia Sotomayor gave a speech in which she said some really kind things about Justice Clarence Thomas and the way that he interacts with court personnel.

But Justice Elena Kagan said something interesting. She said the collegiality that America should be looking for — and I'm paraphrasing — is not "Do we go to the opera together?" but "Are we open to each other?" Are we collegial enough to where we are open to each other? What is your temperature check on the collegiality of the court?

Gorsuch: Well, you're not going to drag me to an opera, David.

French: I wasn't expecting to.

Gorsuch: There's a lot in that question.

French: Yeah.

Gorsuch: I don't know whether you want me to talk first about the court.

French: Let's go first with the court and then with the culture.

Gorsuch: Sure. So with the court, I think it is important that we're friends and that we enjoy each other's company. We have a nice dining room upstairs. Lovely dining room, but it is the government, and we bring our own lunch. And oftentimes you'll see the chief justice with a brown bag and a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. OK. Those moments are important. They're human. But I also take the point that collegiality in a work environment means being able to work together well. And can I share just some numbers with you that I think tell the story on that?

Gorsuch goes on to explain that the Court decides many cases unanimously, and that he often votes for the "liberal" side of the case. And he says those unexpected coalitions are evidence of "collegiality."

Gorsuch: We decide the 60, 70 hardest cases in the country every year where lower courts have disagreed. That's the only point to get a case to the Supreme Court. We just want federal law — largely our job is to make sure it's uniform throughout the country, and if the circuit courts are in agreement, there's very little reason for us to take a case, unless it's of extraordinary importance.

So most of the work we do is when lower court judges disagree about the law. Magically, I think in this country there are only about 60 or 70 cases. You could argue a little bit more, a little bit less, but there aren't thousands of them. They're very few in number.

There are nine of us who've been appointed by five different presidents over the course of 30 years. We have very different views about how to approach questions of statutory interpretation, constitutional interpretation about political disagreements or interpretive methodological disagreements. Yet we're able to reach a unanimous verdict on the cases that come before us about 40 percent of the time, I think it might have been even higher this last term. I don't think that happens automatically.

I think that's the product of a lot of hard work. I think that's proof of collegiality. OK? That is what we do and we do well. Now people often say, "Well, what about the 6-3s?" Fair enough. Fair enough. But that's about a third of our docket. And it turns out they aren't always what you think they are. About half the 6-3s this last term are not the 6-3s you're thinking about.

Okay, Gorsuch does not actually answer the second part of Kagan's question. The fact that the Justices vote in unusual ways reflects the fact that all of the Justices are, to various extents, heterodox. They are not–contrary to what you might read–ideologues. Trust me, if we had an actual MAGA Court, things would look very different. But Gorsuch does not even hint that collegiality requires a willingness to be persuaded. It is the facts of a case, and the arguments advanced by counsel, that determine the unusual lineups.

I would like this same question posed to Justice Barrett. I think she might see things differently.

French also asked about Justice Kagan's ethics proposal. Gorsuch explains that the facts changed since Kagan's speech. Namely, President Biden wrote a pointless op-ed and Senator Schumer introduced a nuclear bill.

French: We're running out of time, so I do want to get to a couple of other questions. One, Justice Kagan also raised this interesting idea regarding ethics. And she talked about that the Supreme Court has a code of ethics that she appreciates, but she also talked about the possibility of enforcement through — and I'll read the quote here, one moment — "If the chief justice appointed some sort of committee of highly respected judges with a great deal of experience, with a reputation for fairness, you know, that seems like a good solution to me."

And a reason for that, the creation of sort of an outside judicial panel would, part of it would be to protect the court, to provide an outside voice that could not only adjudicate potentially valid claims but also debunk invalid accusations. And she made it clear she was speaking only for herself. What's your reaction to that concept?

Gorsuch: Well, David, since that talk, there's been some developments in the world, and this is now a subject that's being intensely discussed by the political branches, and I just don't think it would be very useful for me to comment on that at the moment.

In hindsight, would Kagan still have given her remarks, knowing what would come the following week? Or perhaps Kagan knew what was coming, and gave her remarks to shift the Overton Window? We are working with a crafty, plugged-in operator here, so be skeptical. How does that work for collegiality?

Some Highlights From Justice Gorsuch's WSJ Interview

Justice Gorsuch likes the new oral argument format and he writes his own opinions.

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Justice Gorsuch gave a wide-ranging interview with Kyle Peterson in the Wall Street Journal. The focus is his new book, which will be released on Tuesday. There are also some insights into how the Court functions post-COVID, and how his chambers operate.

First, Gorsuch strongly intimates that the Dobbs leak did not come from his chambers. I doubt any NMG clerks lawyered up, or refused to turn over their devices:

Did the Covid pandemic and the 2022 leak of the Dobbs abortion ruling change how the high court operates? Not much, apparently. "Unsurprisingly, the court has taken more security precautions with respect to its internal drafts," Justice Gorsuch says. He declines to detail what he told his clerks about the leak. "I can tell you," he says, in a low steely voice, "that it was very important to me that anybody who works for me was totally cooperative with the investigation. And they were."

Second, Gorsuch seems to appreciate the interminable round-robin format:

Oral arguments, influenced by pandemic teleconferences, have become "a little more leisurely." Lawyers now get two minutes to speak and settle in before the interrogating begins, which Justice Gorsuch says he loves: "They're all overcaffeinated and underslept, and they have a point they want to make." At the end, each justice is given a turn for final queries. "You don't have to elbow your way in," he says. "You never leave oral argument thinking, gosh, there's a question I wanted to ask."

I am not a fan. Then again, I'm not the one trying to ask questions.

Third, Gorsuch does not like his own writing:

Then comes the work of drafting rulings, where Justice Gorsuch says his colleagues shine. "I think we have an unusually large number of very gifted writers on the court right now," he says. "I'm not patting myself on the back. I put myself kind of in the middle of the pack, frankly." Asked if he has a favorite of his opinions, he answers without pausing to think: "Nope. I hate 'em all. Do you like reading your old writing?" Sometimes the job requires it. "Inevitably I think, ah, I wish I'd said this differently, ah, I didn't explore that enough."

I agree, and would put Gorsuch around the middle of the Court with writing prowess. My current top three are Roberts, Kagan, and Barrett. But Gorsuch writes in his own distinct tone, which works for him. On that point…

Fourth, Gorsuch states that he writes his own opinions. This is not surprising, since his tone is so distinctive, term-after-term:

What is his drafting process? "I like to have a law clerk do something," Justice Gorsuch says, even if he ultimately follows the practice of his old boss, Justice Byron White: "He'd say, write me something. And he'd read it. And then he'd throw it away. And then he'd write his own thing." This isn't to say the clerks are wasting time: "It's informative to see how another mind might approach the problem."

But then Justice Gorsuch sits down to write a complete draft himself. "It's a pretty intense, lock-yourself-in-a-room-with-the-materials process," he says. "At the end of the end of the end of the day," he says, repeating himself for emphasis, "I'm the one who took the oath, right? And I have to satisfy myself, that I've gone down every rabbit hole, and I understand the case thoroughly, and I'm doing my very best job to get it right."

I appreciate that Justice Gorsuch is now writing books at a regular clip. It is unfortunate that Gorsuch's royalties pale in comparison to his colleagues'. But that shouldn't matter. Gorsuch is writing about important legal topics, in much the same way that Justices Scalia and Breyer did. Gorsuch is trying to affect the long-term legal conversation. The other Justices are trying to… well, write about themselves.

For what it's worth, Gorsuch seems to identify as a libertarian-but-not-a-nut:

Whatever the cause, he worries that the U.S., with its accumulated statutory commands and regulatory crimes, is on the far side of what one might call the legal Laffer curve. "Too little law poses problems," he says. "I love my libertarian friends, but I am not with them on anarchy, OK? Law is essential." And yet: "Too much law actually winds up making people fear law rather than respect law, fear their institutions rather than love their institutions."

I can relate.

Politics

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Heated depositions, wellness checks, and strip searches.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

New cert petition! In 2013, a Clovis, Calif. officer disclosed to a fellow officer that his girlfriend had filed a confidential domestic violence complaint against him—knowing full well that she was trapped in a room with him at that very moment. He then brutally attacked her. And though the Ninth Circuit ruled earlier this year that it was "obvious" that disclosing the report put her in grave danger, it granted the first officer qualified immunity anyway, finding that no factually identical prior case gave the officer fair notice the disclosure was unconstitutional. The decision reinforces a circuit split and also conflicts with Supreme Court precedent that says a factually identical case is not necessary in situations where an official has time and opportunity to deliberate (as opposed to a split-second decision on the use of force). Today, IJ asked the Supreme Court to weigh in.

Is school choice racist? Did it originate with post-Brown v. Board opposition to public school integration? Shameful mistruths! IJ Senior Attorney Michael Bindas takes to the Syracuse Law Review and sets the record straight.

Over at the Advisory Opinions podcast, IJ's Anthony Sanders indicts Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who turns out to have been a bit of a bad egg Constitution-wise.

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I've Looked at Law from Both Sides, Now

I really don't know law at all.

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Hey all, I wrote this right after Joni Mitchell sang "Both Sides, Now" at the Grammys in February, but I only just got around to recording it and posting it on YouTube. Enjoy, and please share with the lawyers or law students in your lives!

P.S. If you want more law songs, check out my "You Don't Need a Canon" (studio version here, music video version here) and "The Ballad of FDA v. Brown & Williamson". Or, if law isn't your thing, try "Palladio Shark" or my "Sasha Reads" playlist of favorite poetry.

P.P.S. My favorite version of "Both Sides, Now" is the original Judy Collins recording, but also check out the version from the recent movie CODA (album version here, partial movie clip here). My song uses the CODA arrangement at 1.5x speed.

Trump is Wrong (and Offensive) re Harris's Racial/Ethnic Identity

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Given Donald Trump's recent remarks about Kamala Harris' racial/ethnic identity, it's an unfortunate coincidence that I posted something earlier this week noting that Harris once emphasized her Indian heritage more.

So just to formally disassociate myself from Trump's views, no, I do NOT think that Harris is faking a black identity, and the fact that she once gave more public attention to the Indian part of her heritage as part of her political persona does NOT mean that she is insincere in also having a black identity.

And it's quite silly and offensive to say she can't identify with *both* her black and Indian heritages. And she has! From what I can tell, from the earliest point in her public career she was quite forthright in stating that her (largely absent) father was black, her mother was Indian, and that her mother took pains to raise her with exposure to both cultures and identities.

Not surprisingly, she emphasizes one or the other publicly depending on the context–doing an Indian cooking segment with Mindy Kaling vs. speaking to a gathering of her historically black college sorority, for example. And of course sometimes there is political salience to emphasizing one identity or another. But she's is, after all, a politician, so she should be expected to act like one!

As the author of a book about modern racial classification in the US, one thing I've noted is that she rarely if ever refers to herself as "multiracial." That's also quite understandable. A 'multiracial' movement gained steam in the US in the early 1990s, powered primary by young activists with one black and one non-black parent. One thing that particularly irked them was that not only could you not check "multiracial" on the Census and other federal forms (you still can't), but you had to choose only one racial box to check, you could not check "Asian American" and "Black," for example (now you can, since 1997). But when Harris came of age a bit before this was a "thing," so it's not surprising that she doesn't use the multiracial nomenclature.

UPDATE: Here is Trump's statement, made during an interview at a conference of black journalists: "I didn't know she was Black until a number of years ago when she happened to turn Black and now, she wants to be known as Black. So, I don't know, is she Indian or is she Black?… she was Indian all the way, and then all of a sudden she made a turn, and she went—she became a Black person." I suppose Trump is also a product of his times, when you had to "choose" one identity, at least officially, but I suspect that it more comes down to him trying to turn a segment of black voters against her by falsely suggesting that she's exploiting a black heritage that she previously neglected.

Administrative Law

Sixth Circuit Puts Net Neutrality Rule on Ice

A three-judge panel concludes the rule's challenger are likely to succeed on the merits.

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Today a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted broadband providers' request for a stay of the Federal Communications Commission's rule that would classify broadband internet providers as common carriers under the Communications Act, often referred to as "net neutrality." According to the panel, the broadband providers were likely to succeed on the merits–in part due to the major questions doctrine–and this justified staying the rule pending review of their petitions. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Sutton and Judges Clay and Davis.

From the court's unanimous per curiam order:

Broadband internet refers to the set of platforms that permit users to access the internet at speeds faster than dial-up services. . . . Over three-quarters of Americans have access to high-speed broadband service. . . . In addition to renting or constructing the physical network connecting computers, broadband internet providers offer other services that enable subscribers to access content from "edge providers"–namely websites, such as Google, Netflix, and Amazon, that host content on their own networks. . . . These services include DNS, short for Domain Name Services, a "phonebook" that matches web addresses (e.g., http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov) with their IP (internet protocol) addresses. And they include "caching" services that speed up data access by storing copies of edge provider content closer to the user's home system. . . .

The Communications Act of 1934 covers broadband providers, and it gives the Federal Communications Commission authority to promulgate rules and regulations under the Act. The extent of that regulatory authority turns on whether the providers count as common carriers under the Act. If a business counts as a common carrier, it must comply with Title II of the Act, which includes rate-review regulations and non-discrimination obligations. . . . For other businesses, the Commission may impose only the ancillary regulations authorized under Title I, which generally preserve the ability of companies to respond to market conditions. . . .

The development of the internet presented the Commission with a classification challenge. When Congress first enacted this law in 1934, it defined common carriers to include anyone involved in "wire communications." . . . Think telephone companies and the monopolies that went with them. But by the 1970s, telephone companies and others had begun competing to offer data processing services through telephone wires. . . . Common carrier rules designed for telephone-wire monopolies, the Commission realized, could inhibit the development of "data information services." . . . The Commission responded by distinguishing the "basic transmission service" that transferred data between two points from the "enhanced service" that allowed subscribers to interact with data stored elsewhere.

Responding to these developments, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It established a new category of "telecommunications service," which offers "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received." . . . The Commission must treat telecommunications service providers as common carriers. . . . The 1996 Act also created a new category of "information service," which applies to a company that offers "a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications." The Commission may not treat information service providers as common carriers. . . .

After passage of the 1996 Act, the Commission for many years took the view that broadband internet access services were information services, not telecommunication services. That left them free of Title II's common carrier requirements. . . .

Reviewing a decision from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court upheld this classification under Chevron. [See Brand X]. . . Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the classification of broadband internet access offered through cable modems as an information service was a permissible interpretation of the Communications Act. . . .

In 2010, the Commission continued to treat broadband internet services as something covered by Title I but opted to alter its rules based on a debate over the risk that broadband providers could favor some edge providers' content over others. . . . The Commission tried to use its Title I authority to impose "open internet" rules on broadband providers that banned them from blocking or unreasonably discriminating between lawful content. . . . A federal court invalidated this rule on the ground that the Commission could impose such requirements only under Title II.

The next chapter unfolded in 2015. That year, the Commission promulgated a rule that categorized broadband providers as common carriers and required net neutrality under Title II. . . .

In 2018, the Commission returned to its prior view. It issued a new rule that broadband providers fall under Title I and do not qualify as common carriers. . . . The D.C. Circuit again upheld the classification and again did so under Chevron. . . .

On May 22, 2024, the Commission switched positions again. Under its current rule, the Commission has classified broadband providers as common carriers under Title II. . . . The rule requires broadband providers to disclose "accurate information regarding the network management practices" and forbids them from engaging in blocking, throttling, paid prioritization, and "unreasonable interference" with users and edge providers. . . . The rule at this point forbears other Title II regulations, including rate regulation and tariffing. . . .

The petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits because the final rule implicates a major question, and the Commission has failed to satisfy the high bar for imposing such regulations. Although the petitioners have raised other arguments in support of their position that the FCC exceeded its authority in promulgating the rule at issue, such as whether broadband can be classified as a telecommunications service under the Communications Act and the stare decisis effect of the Brand X decision, we decline to reach those arguments at this preliminary stage.

An agency may issue regulations only to the extent that Congress permits it. . . . When Congress delegates its legislative authority to an agency, it presumably resolves "major questions" of policy itself while authorizing the agency to decide only those "interstitial matters" that arise in day-to-day practice. . . .When Congress upsets that presumption and delegates its power to “alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme” to an agency, it must speak clearly, without "hid[ing] elephants in mouseholes." The more an agency asks of a statute, in short, the more it must show in the statute to support its rule.

Net neutrality is likely a major question requiring clear congressional authorization. As the Commission's rule itself explains, broadband services "are absolutely essential to modern day life, facilitating employment, education, healthcare, commerce, community-building, communication, and free expression," to say nothing of broadband's importance to national security and public safety.

Congress and state legislatures have engaged in decades of debates over whether and how to require net neutrality. Because the rule decides a question of "vast economic and political significance," it is a major question. . . . The Communications Act likely does not plainly authorize the Commission to resolve this signal question. Nowhere does Congress clearly grant the Commission the discretion to classify broadband providers as common carriers. To the contrary, Congress specifically empowered the Commission to define certain categories of communications services–and never did so with respect to broadband providers specifically or the internet more generally. . . . Absent a clear mandate to treat broadband as a common carrier, we cannot assume
that Congress granted the Commission this sweeping power, and Petitioners have accordingly shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits. . . .

Chief Judge Sutton also wrote a separate concurrence, emphasizing that even without the major questions doctrine, the FCC would likely lose. As Sutton notes, "The best reading of the statute, and the one in place for all but three of the last twenty-eight years, shows that Congress likely did not view broadband providers as common carriers under Title II of the Telecommunications Act."

Senator Schumer Goes Nuclear With "No King Act"

The law would direct lower courts how to reject claims of presidential immunity, and strip SCOTUS of appellate review.

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Very little actually surprises me anymore. Even something unexpected is generally within some range of possibility that I anticipated. The "No Kings Act," which was introduced today by Senate Majority Leader, surprised me. No, just not surprised. It stunned me. I was actually speechless.

At a high level, the statute purports to reverse Trump v. United States, eliminate criminal presidential immunity (but not civil), and divests the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over any prosecution of a former President, or even a challenge to the statute itself.

Let's walk through the bill. Section 2 explains that the "purpose" of the law is to "clarify that a President or Vice President is not entitled to any form of immunity from criminal prosecution for violations of the criminal laws of the United States unless specified by Congress." Clarify? That statement expressly conflicts with the holding of Trump. And Section 3 provides, "A President, former President, Vice President, or former Vice President shall not be entitled to any form of immunity (whether absolute, presumptive, or otherwise) from criminal laws of the United States unless specified by Congress." This statement flatly contradicts how a majority of the Supreme Court interpreted Article II.

Curiously, the statute says nothing at all about civil immunity under Nixon v. Fitzgerald. Apparently that made-up immunity, which was the basis of Chief Justice Roberts's decision, is A-Okay. Also, nothing in Trump even hinted that the Vice President has immunity. This provision could have some unintended consequences for the Vice President acting as President of the Senate, who (under modern law) receives some protections under the Speech or Debate Clause.

It gets worse, The law provides that federal courts "may not consider whether an alleged violation of any criminal laws of the United States committed by a President or Vice President was within the conclusive or preclusive constitutional authority of a President or Vice President or was related to the official duties of a President or Vice President unless directed by Congress." If taken literally, this statute directs lower courts to not follow binding Supreme Court precedent–they cannot consider the exact thing that the Supreme Court said must be considered. If only Republicans responded this way to Planned Parenthood v. Casey: federal courts "may not consider' whether a law imposes a substantial burden on access to abortion. That would have been so simple!

Congress is certainly free to make such statements. It is a coordinate department of government that is entitled to interpret the Constitution. But unless we are willing to cross the rubicon of judicial supremacy, lower courts would be required to ignore Congress and follow SCOTUS. Now don't get me wrong. I despise Cooper v. Aaron. If it takes Trump Derangement Syndrome to blow up judicial supremacy, then that may have been worth it. I think of Heath Ledger as the Joker walking away from the exploding hospital. But Schumer doesn't quite have the chutzpah to go that far. Instead, he proposes a ham-handed way of playing keep-away from John Roberts.

Section 4 of the law modifies judicial review of "any criminal proceeding commenced by the United States" against a President or former President. Actions can be brought in the applicable district court. But here comes the kicker: the judgment of the court of appeals with regard to immunity is final!

"The Supreme Court of the United States shall have no appellate jurisdiction, on the basis that an alleged criminal act was within the conclusive or preclusive constitutional authority of a President or Vice President or on the basis that an alleged criminal act was related to the official duties of a President or Vice President."

A conviction of the President of the United States would stop with the inferior courts, and most likely, the D.C. Circuit, which by the way, will have a Democratic-appointed majority for at least the next two decades or so. If only President Reagan had thought of this idea when he had appointed the majority of judges on that court!

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